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Abstract
This work presents a descending-price-auction algorithm to obtain the maximum market-
clearing price vector (MCP) in unit-demand matching markets with m items by exploiting the
combinatorial structure. With a shrewd choice of goods for which the prices are reduced in
each step, the algorithm only uses the combinatorial structure, which avoids solving LPs and
enjoys a strongly polynomial runtime of O(m4). Critical to the algorithm is determining the
set of under-demanded goods for which we reduce the prices simultaneously in each step of
the algorithm. This we accomplish by choosing the subset of goods that maximize a skewness
function, which makes the bipartite graph series converges to the combinatorial structure at the
maximum MCP in O(m2) steps. A graph coloring algorithm is proposed to find the set of goods
with the maximal skewness value that yields O(m4) complexity.
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1 Introduction
Online Advertising is an over $70 billion businesswith double-digit growth in consecutive years
over a period of many years. Since nearly all of the ads are sold via auction mechanisms, auction-
based algorithm design, which focuses on the online advertising, has become an important class of
mechanism design to study. Among all online advertising auctions, the sponsored search auction,
also known as a keyword auction, is the one that most captures researchers’ attention.
In a typical sponsored search auction, the auctioneer has a set of web slots to sell and every
advertiser has different valuations on different web slots. Problems in sponsored search auctions are
usually modeled as problems in (cardinal-preference) matching markets, and prices are used to clear
the market. The key assumption of sponsored search auctions is that every advertiser shares the
identical ordinal preference on web slots. Under this assumption, the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism [1, 2, 3], which makes truthful bidding by the advertisers as (weakly)
dominant strategies but yields low revenue to the auctioneer, is adopted by some web giants such as
Facebook1, and is also a robust option in scenarios where the revenue equivalence theorem [4] holds.
However, as the revenue equivalence theorem does not hold in multi-good auctions [5], auctioneers
can look for greater expected revenue than the value obtained by VCG mechanism by using even
different efficient and market-clearing auction mechanisms. The most popular auction among these
mechanisms is the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction employed by Google. Since the GSP is
not incentive compatible, its equilibrium behavior needs to be analyzed [5, 6, 7], and there are some
Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) [4] that have greater expected revenue than the expected revenue
of the VCG mechanism. It should also be noted that designing (revenue) optimal mechanisms [8] is
intractable [9, 10] even in the context of matching markets when there is more than one good. Thus,
the possibility of higher expected revenue coupled with the ease of implementing the GSP auction
and the intractability of optimal mechanisms has lead to the popularity of the GSP mechanism.
Unlike a decade ago where there were only statically-listed ads, websites now serve a variety of
ads simultaneously, including sidebar images, pop-ups, embedded animations, product recommen-
dations, etc. With this in mind, and the growing heterogeneity in both advertisers and consumers,
it is clear that the “shared ordinal preference” assumption is untenable in the context of market
design. Search engines and ad-serving platforms will be faced with a growing need to implement
general unit-demand matching markets [11], and such market settings are the focus of our work.
We refer to the prices that efficiently allocate the set of goods to the bidders according to their
private valuations as a vector of market-clearing prices (MCP). An ascending price auction algo-
rithm that generalizes the English auction was presented by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor [12].
This ascending price algorithm (DGS algorithm) obtains the element-wise minimum MCP, that
coincides with the VCG price. DGS is thus incentive compatible yet obtains low expected revenue
for the mechanism. Of course, simultaneously maximizing revenue and maintaining incentive com-
patibility is computationally intractable once we have more than one good for sale, but we should
still hope to obtain better than the minimum MCP within efficient mechanisms.
In the present paper we design a family of mechanisms that seek to elicit the maximum MCP
from the participants without sacrificing computational efficiency. Here we focus explicitly on how
we can efficiently compute the maximum MCP given some representation of the bidder utilities,
and defer the general2 analysis of strategic behavior to future work.
Critical to our paper would be answering whether there exists a strongly polynomial-time al-
1Facebook Ad Auction: See https://www.facebook.com/business/help/163066663757985.
2Several illustrative instances of Bayesian equilibrium of strategic buyers are discussed in the full version [13]. One
particular instance explicitly demonstrates an example where our mechanism yields greater expected revenue when
compared to the expected revenue of the VCG mechanism.
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gorithm to obtain the maximum MCP exactly. Before discussing the literature for the maximum
MCP, we discuss the state of the art for the minimum MCP. The intuitively appealing DGS ascend-
ing price algorithm that attains the minimum MCP is only weakly polynomial time: the potential
function used to show convergence depends on the valuations; and its value decrements by at
least a constant independent of the valuations in each step. In fact, it is the well-known strongly
polynomial-time Hungarian algorithm [14] for finding the maximum weight matching in a weighted
bipartite graph, that yields a strongly polynomial time algorithm for finding the minimum MCP,
O(m4) in the original implementation that can then be reduced to O(m3) [15]. This will be the
aspirational goal of this work.
Using the method outlined in [16], where one computes the solution of two linear programs, it is
possible to determine the maximum MCP. Note, however, that this is at best a weakly polynomial-
time algorithm, and is neither a combinatorial nor an auction algorithm. Given that the DGS
ascending price mechanism returns the minimum MCP, it is also intuitive to study descending
price mechanisms to obtain the maximum MCP, i.e., generalize the Dutch auction to multiple
goods. The first attempt to obtain the maximum MCP through descending price auction is in
the work by Mishra and Garg [17], where they provide a descending-price-based auction algorithm
that yields an approximation algorithm. The algorithm doesn’t require agents to bid their whole
valuation but still yields a price-vector in weakly polynomial-time3 that is within  in l∞ norm of the
maximum MCP4. Therefore, in this work, one of main goals is to develop a strongly polynomial-
time combinatorial/auction algorithm using descending prices for the exact computation of the
maximum MCP. Note that based on the analysis in [18] choosing the maximum MCP in sponsored
search markets has exactly the same complexity as the VCG, GSP and Generalized first-price
(GFP) mechanisms: The web-slots are sold from best to the worst and in decreasing order of the
bids of the agents, with the only difference being the price that’s ascribed to each good. Once
the computational problem is solved, setting the maximum MCP is a viable option for general
unit-demand markets, and is an alternate efficient mechanism.
1.1 Our contribution
By judiciously exploiting the combinatorial structure in matching markets, we propose a strongly
polynomial-time5 descending price auction algorithm that obtains the maximum MCPs in time
O(m4) with m goods (and bidders). Critical to the algorithm is determining the set of under-
demanded goods (to be defined precisely later on) for which we reduce the prices simultaneously in
each step of the algorithm. This we accomplish by choosing the subset of goods that maximize a
skewness function, which is obtained by proposed graph coloring algorithm a simple combinatorial
algorithm to keep updating the bipartite graph and the collection under-demanded goods set. We
start by discussing an intuitively appealing algorithm to solve this problem that uses the Hopcraft-
Karp [19] algorithm and Breadth-First-Search (BFS). This procedure will only yield a complexity
of O(m4.5). We will then present a refinement that cleverly exploits past computations and the
structure of the problem to reduce the complexity to O(m4).
3Again, as the number of iterations depends on both  and the input valuation matrix.
4Even though the final price may not be market clearing, decreasing it further by  and then running the DGS
algorithm, it is possible to obtain a market-clearing price that is within 2 of the maximum MCP.
5See Section 3 for a definition of strongly and weakly polynomial-time complexity.
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2 Related Work
While sponsored search auctions are a recent motivation to study matching markets, there is a vast
history to the problem. The term “matching market” can be traced back to the seminal paper
“College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage” work by Gale and Shapley [11]. In matching
markets, the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an efficient matching using Hall’s
marriage theorem [20] has been proved [21] and a widely used mathematical model of two-sided
matching markets was introduced in “The Assignment Game I: The Core” [22] by Shapley and
Shubik. In [22], the set of MCPs is further shown to be solutions of a linear programming (LP)
problem and the lattice property is also established. Despite this the study of this problem goes
back at least to the well-known strongly polynomial-time Hungarian algorithm [14] for finding the
maximum weight matching in a weighted bipartite graph, which in fact can also be used to find
the minimum MCP. Furthermore, several auction algorithms enhancing the run-time efficiency in
markets with specific properties have been presented in [23, 24]. Leonard [16] considered mecha-
nisms with sealed-bids and proved that charging the minimum competitive equilibrium price from
bidders will result in an incentive compatible mechanism, and also that MCP coincides with the
VCG price. Soon after, an ascending-price-based auction [4] algorithm was presented by Demange,
Gale, and Sotomayor (DGS) in [12], which starts at the zero-price vector and then increases the
posted price for any of the minimal over-demanded sets [21] of goods to obtain the minimum MCP.
Thereafter, plenty of ascending-price-based auction mechanisms have been studied under different
assumptions in [25, 26, 27]. We pause here to remind the reader that the DGS ascending price
algorithm is only known to be weakly polynomial-time.
On the other hand, there has only been a limited study of descending-price auction algorithms
to obtain the maximum MCP. Mishra and Parkes present a descending price auction called the
Vickrey-Dutch auction to generate the VCG price in equilibrium [28]. To aim for a higher revenue
for sellers, Mishra and Garg generalized the Dutch auction to provide a descending-price-based
approximation algorithm in [17]. As mentioned in Section 1, Mishra and Garg’s algorithm yields
an approximation to the maximum MCP via a weak polynomial-time algorithm, and furthermore,
there is no analysis of the strategic bidding in their work. We remark again that the sequential LP
approach in [16] can be used to obtain the maximum MCP via a weakly polynomial-time algorithm.
Finally, there is a body of literature that attempts to raise the revenue of sellers in equilibrium
in related problems, such as sponsored search auctions and combinatorial auctions. In sponsored
search markets, Ghosh and Sayedi considered a two-dimensional bid on advertisers’ valuations
according to exclusive and nonexclusive display [29], then run a GSP-like auction to determine the
allocation that maximizes the search engine’s revenue. With this small variation, efficiency does
not hold for GSP, and hence the revenue will be different from the VCG mechanism. Additionally,
in combinatorial auctions, it is well-known that designing a revenue maximizing auction mechanism
is still an open problem. To achieve a higher expected revenue of sellers, Likhodedov and Sandholm
presented a class of auctions, called virtual valuations combinatorial auctions [30], to maximize the
sum of a pre-determined weighted valuation and an evaluation function of allocation rather than
maximizing the total valuations as in the VCG mechanism to get a higher revenue.
3 Preliminaries and Problem Formulation
Bipartite Graphs A bipartite graph G = (M,B, E) is a graph such that the vertices M∪B
can be divided into two disjoint subsets,M and B, and there are no edges connecting vertices in the
same subset, E ⊆M×B. Such a graph is balanced if |M| = |B|, i.e., if the two subsets have the
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same cardinality. A perfect matching in a balanced bipartite graph G = (M,B, E) is a subset of
edges Epm ⊆ E such that every vertex in G is incident upon exactly one edge of the matching. We
denote the neighbors of a set of vertices S by N(S), where N(S) , {j ∈ B : ∃i ∈ S s.t. (i, j) ∈ E}
when S ⊆M and N(S) , {j ∈M : ∃i ∈ S s.t. (j, i) ∈ E} when S ⊆ B.
Definition 1. A set S ⊆M or S ⊆ B in a bipartite graph G = (M,B, E) is called a constricted
set if |S| > |N(S)|. More precisely, we call S a constricted good set if S ⊂M or a constricted
buyer set if S ⊂ B.
Theorem (Hall’s marriage theorem [20]). For a balanced bipartite graph G = (M,B, E), G
contains no perfect matching if and only if G contains a constricted set.
Matching Market We consider a matching market with a set B of buyers, and a setM heteroge-
neous merchandise with exactly one copy of each type of good. Each buyer i ∈ B has a non-negative
valuation vij ≥ 0 for good j ∈M , and desires at most one good (e.g. they are unit-demand buyers).
We denote the |B| × |M| valuation matrix by V. Our assumption that |B| = |M| = m is without
loss of generality because we can always add dummy goods or dummy buyers for balance.
Given a price vector P = [P1 P2 ... Pm], we assume a quasi-linear utilities for the buyers, i.e.,
buyer i receiving good j has utility Ui,j = vi,j − Pj . Since each buyer is unit-demand, we define
U∗i be the maximum (non-negative) payoff of buyer i ∈ B, i.e., U∗i = max
{
0,max
j∈M
vi,j − Pj
}
. Since
buyers can opt out of the market and obtain zero, we insist on the payoff being non-negative.
Definition 2. Under a price vector P, the preferred-good set of buyer i ∈ B is a set of goods
Li ⊆M such that getting each good in Li maximizes buyer i’s payoff, Li = {j ∈M|vi,j−Pj = U∗i }.
Note that the preferred goods set of a buyer is empty if its payoff for all the goods is negative.
Definition 3. By connecting each buyer with its preferred goods and recalling the assumption of
|M | = |B|, we can construct a balanced bipartite graph which we call the preference graph, i.e.,
Gpref = (M,B, Epref) where Epref = {(j, i) : i ∈ B and j ∈ Li}.
To avoid any confusion, we always place goods on the left-hand side and buyers on the right-hand
side of the preference graphs.
Definition 4. The set of goods M is over-demanded in Gpref if it’s a union of preferred-good sets
of a set of buyers B, where |B| > |M |. Given a particular preference graph Gpref that doesn’t
contain a perfect matching and a constricted buyer set B, an over-demanded set of goods coincides
with the neighbor set of B, i.e., N(B), where the neighbor set is determined in Gpref . Similarly,
the under-demanded set of goods M coincides with a constricted good set.
Given a specific price vector, if the preference graph Gpref contains a perfect matching Epm ⊆
Epref , then we can allocate to each buyer exactly one of the goods it prefers and also sell all the
goods. A price vector that leads to a perfect matching in the realized preference graph is called a
market-clearing price (MCP) (also called a Walrasian price).
Given any valuation V , it is well known that the set of MCPs is non-empty and bounded
[22]. Boundedness is obvious from the finiteness of the valuations. Non-emptiness is established
either using the characterization in [22], using a constructive ascending price algorithm [12] that
starts from all the prices being 0, or by using the VCG mechanism price (see Chap 15 in [31]).
Furthermore, the set of MCPs has a lattice structure [22], so that given any two different MCP
vectors, the element-wise maximum of the vectors and the element-wise minimum of the vectors
are also MCPs. This guarantees the existence of the maximum and the minimum MCPs.
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Complexity of Algorithms An algorithm runs in strongly polynomial time if the number
of operations and the space used are bounded by a polynomial in the number of input parameters,
i.e., O(polynomial of |M |), but both do not depend on the size of the parameters (assuming unit
time for basic mathematical operations). If this does not hold but the number of operations is still
bounded by a polynomial in the number of input parameters where the coefficients depend on the
size of the parameters, then we say that the algorithm runs in weakly polynomial time.
4 Design of Descending Price Algorithm
The problem considered in our work, as mentioned earlier, is to find the generalization of the
Dutch auction6 to matching markets. Specifically, we seek a descending price auction that always
converges to the maximum MCP. Like the DGS mechanism, our mechanism will choose a particular
constricted good set to ensure the convergence. Specifically, we will define a dual to the “minimal
over-demanded set” which we call the maximally skewed set. Unlike minimal over-demanded sets,
the maximally skewed set is unique, and an example of failure to achieve the maximum MCP if
this set is not chosen will be discussed in Section B.1.
4.1 Framework of Descending Price Algorithms
We design a descending auction, which is the analogue of the ascending auction, in a straightfor-
ward framework. We start from a high enough initial price, iteratively pick a constricted good set to
decrement prices, and terminate the algorithm when there exists a perfect matching. Clearly, this
framework does not guarantee the termination in finite time, let alone strongly polynomial time.
In order to make the algorithm run in strongly polynomial time, we will exploit the combinatorial
structure of the preference graph, and make the evolution of the preference graph in the run of the
algorithm be such that any specific bipartite graph appears at most once. To achieve this goal, we
will specify a particular initial configuration, and a particular price reduction to be carried out in
each step of the algorithm.
Initial Price Choice: A perfect matching requires every good be preferred by some buyers.
Then a reasonable starting point should guarantee that the preferred-buyer set of every good is
non-empty, otherwise it cannot be an MCP for any valuation matrix. Thus, the natural candidate
for the initial price is Pj = maxi∈M vi,j for good j, which is (element-wise) greater than or equal
to any MCP but ensures that every good is preferred by at least one buyer from the very outset.
Price Reduction: In computing the price reduction for a given constricted set S, we need to
reduce the price by a large enough amount to trigger a change in the preference graph (otherwise
we still have a constricting set and the same set of goods can be chosen again), but we should also
avoid reducing the price of any good below its price in the maximum MCP. In other words, we
want to find the minimum value to compensate the buyers not in the N(S) to make at least one
buyer indifferent between one of the goods in S and the good(s) she prefers initially; the buyer in
question may have an empty preferred goods set, in which case it is sufficient to ensure that one
of the goods in S has a non-negative utility with the price reduction. Lemma 1 formally states the
price reduction to be used in the proposed family of descending price algorithms.
6Despite a similar sounding name, what we seek to implement is completely different from the generalized first
price (GFP) auction as in [32, 33].
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Figure 1: Criteria for choosing constricted good sets
Lemma 1. Given a constricted good set S and a price vector P, the minimum price reduction of
all goods in this set S guaranteeing to add at least a new buyer to the set N(S) is
min
i∈B\N(S),l∈S
{ max
k∈M\S
(vi,k − Pk)− (vi,l − Pl)}. (1)
4.2 Choice of Constricted Good Sets and The Skewness Function
Since different choices of constricted good sets could generate different MCPs when the algorithm
terminates, pinpointing the right constricted good sets iteratively has a pivotal role when designing
the algorithm for finding the maximum MCP7. Before detailing the selection criterion, we use
Figure 1 to provide some quick intuition. On one hand, we prefer choosing the constricted good
set in LL to LR because we want to choose the largest good set given the same set of neighbors
(buyers). On the other hand, we prefer RL to RR because we do not include any subgraph (set of
good-buyer pairs) that already has a perfect matching. With this intuition in mind, we present the
following formal criteria for choosing constricted-good sets:
1. Pick the constricted goods sets S with the largest difference |S| − |N(S)|.
2. If there are multiple sets with the same |S| − |N(S)|, choose the one with the smallest size.
The first criterion ensures that at each step the algorithm (simultaneously) reduces the price of
the most critical set of goods. The proof that our algorithm returns the maximum MCP will not
hold without this property. As an added bonus it also positively impacts the speed of convergence.
The second criterion excludes any subset of goods S′ ⊂ S which is already perfectly matched to a
subset of buyers, i.e., |N(S′) \N(S)| ≥ |S′|. Jointly the criteria imply that we are searching for the
most “skewed” constricted good set in the preference graph. To formulate this mathematically, we
define a function to measure the skewness of a set.
Definition 5. The skewness of a set of goods S is defined by function f : 2M \ ∅ 7→ R with
f(S) = |S| − |N(S)|+ 1|S| for all S ⊆M with S 6= ∅, where 2M is the power set of M.
With this skewness function, the criteria described earlier are equivalent to choosing the con-
stricted goods set with the maximal skewness. To formally make this statement we need to show
two properties. The first one is the uniqueness of the maximally skewed set when the preference
graph has no perfect matching; and the second one is that the maximally skewed set is a constricted
goods set when the preference graph has no perfect matching. Lemma 2 proves these.
Lemma 2. Given a bipartite graph with no perfect matching, the maximally skewed set is unique
and coincides with the constricted goods set with the maximal skewness.
7Appendix B.1 provides an example where a different choice fails to obtain the maximum MCP.
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With Lemma 2 in place, it easily follows that the two rules we imposed are equivalent to finding
the maximally skewed set at every iteration (as we already know that a perfect matching doesn’t
exist). With the proper initial price vector choice, specified price reduction per round, and the
unique choice of the maximally skewed set, the complete algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
Note that the DGS algorithm, which searches for over-demanded sets to increase the price, has
a dual structure to our algorithm. Thus, it is not surprising that the minimally over-demanded
sets of items in the DGS algorithm, denoted as DGS sets below, have a relationship with the
skewness function f(·). They are ones that obtain the minimum positive value of the function
|N(S)| − |S| − 1|N(S)| when the algorithm starts with initial price 0. We highlight the fact that the
DGS sets may not be unique as there can be multiple sets of goods that yield the same minimum
positive value for the function |N(S)| − |S| − 1|N(S)| . In contrast to our algorithm, the lack of
uniqueness in the DGS algorithm is not as critical because different choices of DGS sets lead to the
same minimum MCP. Understanding this contrast better is for future work.
Algorithm 1 Skewed-set Aided Descending Price Auction
Input: A |B| × |M| valuation matrix V.
Output: MCP P.
1: Initialization, set the price of good j, Pj = maxi∈B vi,j .
2: Construct the preference graph.
3: while There exists a constricted good set do
4: Find the maximally skewed set S.
5: For all j ∈ S, reduce Pj by mini∈B\N(S),l∈S{maxk∈M\S(vi,k − Pk)− (vi,l − Pl)}.
6: Construct the preference graph.
7: end while
8: Return P.
5 Price Attained, Convergence Rate, and Complexity
First, we demonstrate that the proposed skewed-set aided descending price auction algorithm re-
turns the maximum MCP. We achieve this by performing a check by adding a fictitious dummy good
to the preference bipartite graph at termination. Second, we use the potential function to prove
the finite time convergence of the algorithm. Finally, we analyze the complexity of the algorithm
by presenting algorithms to find the maximally skewed set.
5.1 Attaining Maximum Market-Clearing Price
In advance of analyzing the relationship between the skew-aided algorithm and the maximum
MCPs, we have to precisely characterize the extremal nature of the maximum MCP. Wearing an
optimization hat and using the idea of feasible directions, one would expect that checking whether
the MCP of any good can be increased or not is straightforward8. However, this logic misses the
underlying matching problem and the Marriage theorem. Additionally, since the skewed-set aided
algorithm is built on the combinatorial structure of the problem, to bridge the maximum MCP to
our algorithm requires a combinatorial characterization of the maximum MCP. The combinatorial
characterization requires adding a fictitious dummy good to preserve the property. Hence, we have
to provide the following definition before stating the variational and combinatorial characterizations
of the maximum MCP in Theorem 1.
8There is a history of such variational characterizations in the stable matching literature [34, 35] where agents are
assumed to have ordinal preferences.
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Definition 6. Given a bipartite graph G, let NDG (B) be the neighbor set of the buyer set B after
adding a dummy good—a good for which every buyer has value 0. If the graph G is clear from the
context, we will also simplify the notation further to ND(B) after adding a dummy good.
Theorem 1. An MCP P ∗ is the maximum if and only if for any subset of goods, increasing the
price of all goods in the set will change the preference graph such that no perfect matching exists.
Equivalently, by adding a dummy good, P ∗ is the maximum if and only if any subset of buyers B
has a cardinality strictly less than the cardinality of the set of buyers’ neighbors ND(B).
For further clarification, any buyer who has zero surplus at the maximum MCP (by definition
of the maximum there will exist at least one such buyer) will be indifferent between the matched
good and the dummy good. Hence, for every buyer set B containing a zero-surplus buyer, the
dummy good D will be in the neighbor set of this set, D ∈ ND(B). We also show a dual property
to VCG prices of the maximum MCP in Section ??.
With Theorem 1 in hand, we will now establish the correctness of the algorithm, assuming
that it halts (in finite-time). Since the skew-aided algorithm continually changes the preference
graph, it is necessary to label the bipartite graph in each round of our algorithm before starting
any analysis. Let G0 be the initial bipartite graph, in the running of our algorithm, we obtain a
bipartite graph Gt at t
th round. Then, we’ll need to check whether the terminal condition holds.
To avoid cumbersome notation, we will use NDt (B) instead of N
D
Gt
(B).
With Theorem 1, the proof of Theorem 2 followings by checking that the preference graphs at
termination coincides has the combinatorial characterization outlined above.
Theorem 2. The skewed-set aided descending-price algorithm always returns the maximum MCP.
5.2 Preference Graphs Converge Quadratically in the Number of Goods
The Algorithm 1 changes the preference graph in each round to obtain the bipartite graph with
combinatorial structure of MCP at termination. We will now show that the algorithm terminates
in at most m2 rounds.
Given a specific preference graph G, we can define the skewness of the graph W (G) to equal the
skewness of the maximally skewed set. Therefore, by defining a sequenceW (Gt) = maxS∈M,S 6=∅ ft(S),
where Gt is the preference graph obtained at the t
th iteration of Algorithm 1, we show the conver-
gence of the algorithm in finite rounds by proving that W (Gt) strictly decreases with the decrease
at least some positive constant. Thus, W (·) is a potential function that will be shown to strictly
decrease in every iteration of the algorithm in the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. For any unit demand matching market with m > 1 the sequence {W (Gt)}t≥0 of the
skewness value of the maximally skewed set in each round of Algorithm 1 is strictly decreasing with
minimum decrement 1
m2−m .
Given the minimum decrement in Lemma 3, it is straightforward that the preference graphs
converge to the bipartite graph with combinatorial structure of MCP in time upper bounded by
m3 because W (G) < m. However, as there are only m2 positive distinct feasible values of W (G) 9,
we are ensured convergence in time at most m2.
5.3 Complexity of the Algorithm
Based on the results thus far determining the complexity of our algorithm depends only on the
run-time of finding the maximally skewed set. We now discuss two approaches for this.
9Since there are only m possible values of |S| − |N(S)| and m possible values of 1|S| .
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5.3.1 Algorithm design in search of the maximally skewed set
Given the uniqueness, we can always perform a brute-force search to get the maximally skewed
set. Since there are 2m − 1 non-empty subsets ofM, the complexity is O(2m), which doesn’t meet
our goal. We will exploit the combinatorial structure of the preference graph to scale down the
complexity of finding the maximally skewed set. For this we design a graph coloring algorithm to
color the preference graphs in Algorithm 2.
Definition 7. A colored preference graph G(M,B, E) is an undirected graph that colors each vertex
(goods and buyers) in three colors either red, green, or blue; and each edge is colored red or blue.
Denote Xc, X = {M,B}, c = {r, g, b} to be the set of goods/buyers colored red, green or blue. Egbrb
denotes edges connecting goods in Mg ∪Mb and buyers in Br ∪ Bb.
In any colored preference graphs, we want red edges to represent edges connecting matched
pairs of good-buyer in a maximum matching, and blue edges to represent the rest of the edges.
Hence, each vertex has at most one red edge. Additionally, we want the set of red goods Mr to
represent the set of goods not in the maximally skewed set, the set of blue goods Mb to be goods
in the maximally skewed set but ones that do not have matched pairs to buyers in this maximum
matching (because of the nature of constricted good set), and the set of green goods Mg are the
rest of the goods. On the buyer side, the buyers that are neighbors of the maximally skewed set
should be colored green, the buyers that are not the neighbors of the maximally skewed set but
have a matched good should be colored red, and the rest of the buyers should be colored blue.
Given the object we seek, we now present an algorithm to color vertices/edges properly in strongly
polynomial-time complexity. The steps will include an initial coloring and followed by an update
of the preference graph.
Before detailing the initial coloring, we define various depth-first search and breadth-first search
procedures relevant to the algorithm.
Definition 8. A rb-DFS in G(M,B, E) is a depth-first search (DFS) only using red edges fromM
to B and only using blue edges from B to M. Similarly, a br-BFS in G(M,B, E) is a breadth-first
search (BFS) only using blue edges from M to B and only using red edges from B to M. The set
of nodes obtained at the end of the procedure will be called the reachable set Rch(·).
Initial Coloring First, we find a maximum matching using the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm and
color edges linked matched pairs red, and other edges blue. After that, we start from the set
of good without matched buyer in this maximum matching, color them blue, run the br-BFS
algorithm starting from the set of blue goods. When the br-BFS algorithm terminates, color the
set of reachable goods Rch(Mb) ∩M with matched buyers green, color the rest set of goods red.
Then, color the matched buyers of red goods red, color the buyers in the Rch(Mb)∩B green (they
are the neighbors of the most skewed set), and color the rest of buyer blue. Finally, the following
lemma states that we get the maximally skewed set from the initial coloring.
Lemma 4. After the initial coloring, {Mg ∪Mb} is the maximally skewed set.
Given that the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm has complexity O(m2.5) and the br-BFS has complexity
upper-bounded by O(m2), we learn the initial coloring has the complexity O(m2.5). Note that the
initial coloring does not rely on the initial price, our first algorithm, say initial coloring based
decreasing price auction , will use this in every iteration to get the maximally skewed set. This
algorithm has complexity O(m2 ×m2.5) = O(m4.5), which is already strongly polynomial.
Lemma 5. Given a bipartite graph with no perfect matching, initial coloring returns the maximally
skewed set of this bipartite graph in a strongly polynomial run time of O(m2.5).
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Update the preference graph We further scale down the complexity of the initial coloring
based decreasing price auction algorithm by exploiting and updating the colored preference
graph colored in previous round without completely coloring the whole graph. This is detailed
in Algorithm 2. Since the procedure in Algorithm 2 is elaborate, we will highlight some facts of
perfect matching and give the sketch of how we use them in the Algorithm 2.
First, we know that if there is a perfect matching, no vertex should be colored blue otherwise
we fail to get a maximum matching. Furthermore, the following Lemma 6 states that we will never
need to change a vertex from red or green to blue.
Lemma 6. If we have to change the color of a vertex from red or green to blue based on inter-
pretation given to the colors, one of the following is true: a) The coloring of previous preference
graph is incorrect; b) The price reduction is not optimal; c) One of the updates from the previous
preference graph to current graph is wrong.
Given the property of a proper coloring stated in Lemma 6, we know that the set of blue buyers
in round t, denoted as Btb, is a decreasing set. Therefore, the key idea of designing Algorithm 2
is to restrict operations irrelevant to reducing the set of blue buyers to some constant number of
O(m2) operations, and to allow the complexity of operations reducing the set of blue buyers to
be upper-bounded by O(m3). To achieve this, we observe that the set of buyers at round t that
are willing to get goods in previous maximally skewed set, denoted by At, only contains red and
blue buyers, i.e., At ⊆ Btr ∪ Btb. Then, we know that if At ⊆ Br and we cannot reach any blue
buyers from At without passing green or blue goods, then the current matching is maximized,
and all we need to do for updating colors is to run rb-BFS from the set of Mb with complexity
O(m2) as we did in initial coloring. In other cases, we need to find the new maximum matching with
number of matched pairs increased by at least 1, which can be achieved by at least O(m2.5) using the
Hopcroft-Karp algorithm, and at least one blue buyer will be recolored. Since the maximum number
of matched pairs is m, the complexity of the whole algorithm attaining the maximum MCP will be
upper-bounded by the {(complexity of updating process not recoloring blue buyers)+(complexity of
computing price reduction)}× (convergence rate of the preference graph)+(complexity of updating
process increasing maximum matched pairs)× (maximum number of blue buyers)= O((m2 +m2)×
m2 +m2.5 ×m) = O(m4).
Theorem 3. The skewed-aided descending price algorithm has a strongly polynomial run time of
O(m4) by using Algorithm 2 to search the maximally skewed set.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed a descending price algorithm in search of sets of the maximum MCPs
by exploiting the combinatorial structure of bipartite graphs in matching markets. The algorithm
terminates in at most m2 rounds for any non-negative valuation matrix with runtime O(m4).
There are three main avenues for future work. First, we would like to determine whether one can
reduce the complexity further to O(m3) mirroring the Hungarian algorithm. Second, as incentive
compatibility does not hold with the maximum MCP, we would like to determine the equilibrium
bidding strategy in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium given the proposed mechanism. This will be
necessary for expected revenue computation, and for a comparisons with the VCG mechanism, GSP
and laddered auction proposed in [36, 37], and also other mechanisms such as the GFP auction.
Finally, many real-world applications of matching markets outside of the online advertising setting
are not unit-demand [38],and obtaining a combinatorial version of the descending price auction
returning the maximum MCP is a challenging open problem for future work.
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A Appendix-Details of Algorithms
Algorithm 2 Algorithm in search of the maximally skewed set by coloring preference graph
Input: A colored preference graph, a set of buyers A would be added to the neighbor of the
previous maximally skewed set
Output: An updated colored preference graph
1: if Input preference graph is not colored then
2: Run the algorithm for initial coloring
3: else
4: Update the colored preference graph by removing all edges connecting red goods and green
buyers and adding corresponding blue edges connecting goods and buyers in A
5: while {A ∩ Bb} 6= ∅ do
6: Pick an element a in {A ∩ Bb}
7: if |N(a) ∩Mb| > 1 then
8: Pick arbitrary x ∈ {N(a) ∩Mb}, color (a, x) ∈ E red and color a, x green.
9: else if |{N(a) ∩Mb}| = 1 then
10: Let x be the unique good in {N(a) ∩Mb}, color (a, x) ∈ E red and color a, x green.
11: if {N(a) ∩Mg} 6= ∅ then
12: Run the rb-DFS starting from x in G(Mg ∪Mb,Bg, Egbgb) to get a reachable set
Rch(x), then color vertice in Rch(S) red if Rch(x) ∩Mb = {x}
13: else
14: Run the br-DFS starting from a in G(Mg ∪Mb,Bg, Egbgb) to get a reachable set
Rch(a), then color vertice in Rch(S) red if Rch(a) ∩Mb = {x}
15: end if
16: else if {N(a) ∩Mg} 6= ∅ then
17: Run the rb-DFS starting from a in G(Mg ∪Mb,Bg, Egbgb) till find the first x ∈Mb
18: Color a, x green and switch the color of every edge used in a path from a to x.
19: Start a br-BFS from Mb in G(Mg ∪Mb,Bg, Egbg ) to get Rch(Mb).
20: Color every vertex in {Mg ∪ Bg} \Rch(Mb) red
21: end if
22: Remove a from A
23: end while
24: Run the br-BFS starting from {Mg} in G(M,B, E) to get a reachable set Rch(S∗)
25: if {Rch(S∗) ∩ Bb} = ∅ then
26: Color all vertice in Rch(S) \Mb green
27: else
28: while {Rch(S∗) ∩ Bb} 6= ∅ do
29: Pick a ∈ Rch(S∗) ∩ Bb and run rb-DFS starting from a to get Rch(a)
30: if ∃x ∈ Rch(a), x ∈Mb then
31: Color a, x green; switch the color of every edge used in a path from a to x
32: Start a br-BFS from Mb in G(Mg ∪Mb,Bg, Egbg ) to get Rch(Mb).
33: Color every vertex in {Mg ∪ Bg} \Rch(Mb) red
34: end if
35: end while
36: Run the br-BFS starting from {Mb} in G(M,Bg, E) to get Rch(Mb)
37: Color all vertice in {Mg ∪ Bg} \Rch(Mb) red
38: end if
39: end if
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm for initial coloring
Input: A preference graph with no perfect matching
Output: Colored preference graph, the maximally skewed set
1: Find a maximum matching by Hopcroft-Karp algorithm
2: Color every edges connecting a matched pair red and all other edges blue, Color every vertex
in a matched pair red and all other vertice blue
3: Starting from Mb, run the rb-BFS to get a reachable set Rch(Mb)
4: Color Rch(Mb) \Mb green
B Appendix-Discussion
B.1 Importance of Maximally Skewed Set
To highlight the importance of choosing the maximally skewed set in our algorithm, we are starting
to ask a natural question: if we run the algorithm twice but choose different constricted good sets
at some iterations such that the preference graph produced in every round of these two executions
are the same, will we get the same MCP vector?
Unfortunately, the answer is no. The choice of the same initial price vector, the same price
reduction rule, and the emergence of the same bipartite graph in every round are not enough to
guarantee the same returned MCPs. A counterexample is provided in Fig. 2.
A-1 
A-2 
B-1 
B-2 
Figure 2: Counterexample of same bipartite graph but different set MCPs
In Fig. 2, the bipartite graphs A-1, B-1 have the same preference graph. Though the chosen
constricted good sets in A, B are different, they add the same buyer to the constricted graph.
Therefore, the preference graphs in A-2, B-2 are still the same. However, the updated price vector
of A-2, B-2 must be different. If A, B choose the same constricted goods set in every round, the
returned sets of MCPs of A, B must be different. This example shows that just the bipartite
graphs in every round cannot uniquely determine the MCP vector obtained at the termination of
the algorithm.
Then, we state a stronger claim in Lemma 7 that if an algorithm wants to get the maximum
MCP, the law of choosing the constricted good set must pick the maximally skewed set at the round
before termination.
Lemma 7. Given a descending price algorithm with a specific law of choosing the constricted good
set, and assuming this algorithm terminates at round TV when giving valuation matrix Vm, if
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this law may not pick the most skewed set at round TV − 1, this algorithm not always return the
maximum MCP.
However, if a law of choosing the constricted good set pick the maximally skewed on in the
last round before termination, the answer of whether it returns the maximum MCP will be case
by case. Since Fig. 2 provide an example of not achieving the maximum MCP, we now provide an
example which still gets the maximum MCP in Fig. 4.
X A B C
X 3 3 0
Y 0 2 3
Z 0 0 2
X
Y
Z
A
B
C
X
Y
Z
A
B
C
X
Y
Z
A
B
C
X
Y
Z
A
B
C
X
Y
Z
A
B
C
Figure 3: Choosing non-maximally skewed set in the middle but get maximum MCP
In Fig. 4, the algorithm in upper flow runs the algorithm we proposed and choose maximally
skewed set in each round. We pick {A,B} in the first iteration and then pick {A,B,C} in the
second iteration; and the algorithm terminates at P = [1, 1, 2]. The algorithm in lower flow does
not choose the maximally skewed set in the first round, but the algorithm is forced to choose the
maximally skewed set in the second round because it is the only constricted good set. It picked
{A,B,C} and lower the price to [2, 2, 2]; and pick {A,B} to get a MCP at [1, 1, 2]. As shown in
the figure, these two algorithm both return the maximal MCP. Therefore, the space of sets we can
choose which guaranteeing to get the maximum MCP is still an open problem.
B.2 Interpretation of the Maximum MCP Using Buyers’ Externalities,
Since the minimum posted price derived from DGS algorithm corresponds to the personalized VCG
price given by the Clarke pivot rule [2], it is not surprising that there is an analogous structure
between the posted price and the personalized price also for the maximum MCP. The Clarke pivot
rule determines the VCG payment of buyer i using the externality that a buyer imposes on the others
by her/his presence, i.e., payment of buyer i = (social welfare10 of others if buyer i were absent) -
(social welfare of others when buyer i is present). Using the combinatorial characterization of the
maximum MCP, we obtain an exact analogue of the Clarke pivot rule when viewing the maximum
MCP as the personalized price in Theorem 4. In the theorem below we can use any perfect matching
to determine the good matched to buyer i.
Theorem 4. Under the maximum MCP, the price that buyer i pays is (social welfare of the current
market adding a duplicate pair of buyer i and its matched good) - (social welfare of the current
market adding a duplicate buyer i). This price is the same as the decrease in social welfare that
results by removing the good matched to buyer i.
10Social welfare is defined as the sum of buyers’ surplus plus the sum of goods’ prices, which is the same as the
sum of each buyer’s value on her matched good.
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C Appendix-Preliminary Analysis of Strategic Buyers and
Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium
As mentioned in the introduction, the proposed descending price algorithm is not incentive com-
patible so that we need to explore Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) to predict buyers’ strategic
behaviors. From the messaging viewpoint we will assume that we have a direct mechanism where
the buyers bid their valuation: a scalar in sponsored search markets, and a vector in the general
matching market. Algorithm 1 is then applied as a black-box to the inputs to produce a price
on each good and a perfect matching. Although the strategic behavior of buyers is not the main
subject of this work, with expected revenue being an important concern, we provide an instance
achieving higher expected revenue than VCG mechanism in a BNE with asymmetric distributions
of buyers’ valuations. Furthermore, we analyze the BNE in two simple cases with symmetric buyers
and the associated bidding strategy of the buyers.
C.1 An Instance Achieving higher expected revenue than VCG
Given the proposed algorithm, it is important to check if there exists a scenario that our algo-
rithm can achieve a higher revenue than the VCG mechanism. It is well-known that the revenue
equivalence theorem holds with an assumption that valuation of every player is drawn from a path-
connected space in Chap. 9.6.3 of [39]11. Furthermore, there’s a large body of literature that has
discussed the failure of getting the VCG revenue under asymmetric distribution of buyers’ valu-
ations, e.g., see [40]. With this knowledge, we demonstrate a 3 × 3 matching market where our
mechanism achieves higher than VCG revenue, where the buyers have asymmetric distributions of
their valuations.
Consider three advertisers named Alice, Bob, and Carol, and three different types of ads called
listing ads, sidebar ads, and pop-ups. The realized valuation is only known to the advertiser
(equivalently buyer), but the distribution of an advertisers’ valuation is known to other advertisers
but not the auctioneer. In other words, the auctioneer can only calculate the price according to
the bids submitted by the advertisers. The minimum increment of the submitted bids is , which
is a positive infinitesimal, and the valuation matrix of advertisers is displayed in Table 1.
Table 1: Valuation matrix of advertisers
Listing Sidebar Pop-ups
Alice w 0 0
Bob x 0 0.5
Carol y z 2
Probability density function of w, x, y, z
fw(w) =

2
3 w ∈ [0, 1)
1
3 w ∈ (2, 3]
0 o/w
fx(x) =

2
3 x ∈ [1.5, 2.5]
1
3 x ∈ (2.5, 3.5]
0 o/w
fy(y) =
{
2 y ∈ [3.5, 4]
0 o/w
fz(z) =
{
1 z ∈ [3, 4]
0 o/w
11Two other assumptions are (1) both mechanisms implement the same social welfare function; (2) for every player
i, there exists a type that the expected payments are the same in both mechanisms
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Now, we give an asymmetric BNE12 in this matching market and provide a detailed verification
in the Appendix D.11. First, consider Alice always bids 0 on sidebar ads and pop-ups, and bids
max{1−, w2 } on listing ads. The best response of Bob is to bid 0 on both sidebar ads and pop-ups,
and to bid max{1, x−0.52 } on listing ads for any realized x. Now, given Bob’s bidding function
as above, one of Alice’s best responses is to follow her original bidding function. Last, consider
the bidding function of Alice and Bob mentioned above, a best response of Carol is to bid 0 on
listing ads and pop-ups, and to bid  on sidebar ads regardless of the outcomes of y and z. 13,
even if y > z. This is because Carol will never win listing ads for any bids less than 1 as the
probability Pr{y− z ≥ 1} = 0. Now, given Carol’s bidding strategy, Alice and Bob will not change
their bidding functions. Therefore, the strategy {βAlice(w, 0, 0), βBob(x, 0, 0.5), βCarol(y, z, 2)} =
{(max{1− , w2 }, 0, 0), (max{1, 2x−14 }, 0, 0), (0, , 0)} can be verified as an asymmetric BNE.
With the asymmetric BNE in hand, we want to calculate the expected revenue of the auctioneers
and compare it with the expected revenue of the VCG mechanism. Since Carol always wins the
sidebar ads and both Alice and Bob bid 0 on that, Carol will pay . Additionally, in the asymmetric
BNE, Alice and Bob compete on the listing ads and both bid 0 on sidebar ads and pop-ups, resulting
in the payment of listing ads to be the same as the payment in the first price auction. Next, let’s
calculate the expected revenue of auctioneers, which is given by
+
4
9
∫ 1
0
∫ 2.5
1.5
1dxdw +
2
9
∫ 3
2
∫ 2.5
1.5
w
2
dxdw +
2
9
∫ 2
1
∫ 3.5
2.5
2x− 1
4
dxdw
+
1
9
∫ 3
2
∫ w+0.5
2.5
w
2
dxdw +
1
9
∫ 3.5
2.5
∫ x−0.5
2
2x− 1
4
dwdx =
31
27
+  (2)
The last step is to calculate the expected revenue of the VCG mechanism, which is given by
2
3
∫ 1
0
∫ 2.5
1.5
wdxdw +
2
9
∫ 3
2
∫ 2.5
1.5
(x− 0.5)dxdw + 1
9
∫ 3.5
2.5
∫ x−0.5
2
wdwdx
+
1
9
∫ 3
2
∫ w+0.5
2.5
(x− 0.5)dxdw = 1
3
+
2
9
× 3
2
+
1
9
× 7
6
+ +
1
9
× 7
6
=
25
27
(3)
Even if we set  to 0, it is obvious that the expected revenue derived under our descending price
auction algorithm is strictly greater than the expected revenue of the VCG mechanism. This shows
that in some instances the proposed descending price algorithm is preferred to the (DGS) ascending
price algorithm, even taking the strategic behavior of buyers into account.
C.2 Symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in 2× 2 Sponsored Search Market
Now we focus on the analysis of symmetric distributions of buyers. Next we will detail the analysis
of two cases for a market with two goods and two buyers, one in the following paragraphs and
another one in the next subsection.
Since the primary application of our algorithm is in online advertising auctions, it is useful for
us to analyze the strategic behavior under the conventional assumptions made in the sponsored
search market setting. The sponsored search market assumes every buyer’s (advertiser’s) value on
goods (web slots) can be determined by a product of the buyer’s private weight and a common
click-through rate. Now, we consider a 2×2 case in sponsored search market with settings detailed
below.
12There need not be a unique equilibrium.
13The  is designed to avoid complex tie-breaking rules.
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There are two web slots with click-through rates c1 and c2, with c1 ≥ c2, and two advertis-
ers with private weights w1, w2. We assume that wj is an i.i.d. non-negative random variable
with PDF fwj (·), and the private value for getting web slots j is wicj . Each advertiser knows
his/her true weight but only knows the distribution of another advertiser’s value, and both know
that it is a sponsored search market. Under our descending price auction algorithm, they each
have to effectively place a one-dimensional bid, denoted by bi, according to their bidding function
βj(wj , fw−j (·)), where −j denotes the other advertiser(s). To simplify the analysis, we assume
weights w1, w2 are uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Extensions to other symmetric distributions,
asymmetric distribution/knowledge space and more web slots are all for future work.
C.2.1 Payment of advertisers
If c2 = 0, the descending price algorithm terminates at the initial point. At this point, the advertiser
j wins the first web slots pays c1wj and another advertiser pays 0. This is, equivalent, to the single
good case, which has been carefully studied before. When c2 6= 0, the descending price algorithm
makes the advertiser indifferent between two slots if he/she bid truthfully. Therefore, if advertiser
i wins the first slot, the payment will be (c1 − c2)bi + c2b−i, if he/she gets the second slot, the
payment will be c2bi.
C.2.2 Analysis of strategic behavior
Before deriving the bidding function, we show that the bidding function is a monotonic increasing
function of the weight. Since the outcome of this auction is exactly the same as what the VCG
mechanism provides, this monotonicity leads us to expect revenue equivalence to hold in this case.
Exploring the generality of this result is for future work.
Lemma 8. The bidding function is monotonically increasing in the 2× 2 sponsored search market.
Proof. See Appendix D.12.
This monotonicity property of bidding functions can be generalized to all sponsored search
markets when every advertiser’s private weight follows the same uniform distributions.
Corollary 1. In sponsored search markets with a symmetric uniform distribution of every adver-
tiser’s weight, the bidding function is monotonic and the allocation is always efficient.
Proof. See Appendix D.13.
Without loss of generality, we now derive the bidding function of advertiser 1. Since the optimal
bidding function is monotonic in the private value, the surplus function of advertiser 1 can be written
using an integral form. Advertiser 1 wants to maximize the following surplus function14:∫ β−12 (b1)
0
(c1w1 − [(c1 − c2)b1 + c2β2(x)])fw2(x)dx+ c2(w1 − b1)[1−
∫ β−12 (b1)
0
fw2(x)dx] (4)
With detailed analysis presented in Appendix ??, the bidding function β1(w1) is
e−w1 + w1 − 1 c1 = 2c2
w1 − (2− w1) ln(1− 0.5w1) c1 = 1.5c2
c2
2c1 − 3c2
[
(c1 − c2)w1 +
( c2
c2 + (c1 − 2c2)w1
) c1−c2
c1−2c2 − 1
]
otherwise
14In this two advertisers case, for advertiser 1, fw−1(·) = f(w2)(·) and β−1(·) = β2(·).
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Without loss of generality, we can let c1 = 1 and c2 ∈ [0, 1], Figure 4 displays the optimal bidding
bid corresponds to the buyer’s private weight and the ratio of click-through rates.
Figure 4: Optimal bidding function of the symmetric BNE in 2× 2 sponsored search markets
Then, the expected revenue of the search engine is
2
{∫ 1
0
∫ w1
0
([(c1 − c2)β1(w1) + c2β1(w2)])dw2dw1 +
∫ 1
0
∫ w2
0
c2β1(w2)dw1dw2
}
= 2
{
(c1 − c2)
1∫
0
w1β1(w1)dw1 + 2c2
1∫
0
w1∫
0
β1(x)dxdw1
}
=

c2
3 c1 = 2c2
c2
6 c1 = 1.5c2
c1−c2
3 otherwise
It is well known that in the VCG mechanism, the expected VCG revenue is
c1 − c2
3
. Therefore,
in this 2× 2 case, the proposed algorithm has the same expected revenue as the VCG mechanism
after taking the strategic behavior into consideration.
C.3 Symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in 2×2 General Unit-demand Match-
ing Markets
Theoretically, the same method we used to studied the 2× 2 case of a sponsored search market can
be used to solve the 2 × 2 case for a general matching market when valuations are assumed to be
i.i.d.. However, that method requires us to consider two variables simultaneously, and we cannot
avoid solving the resulting partial differential equations. Hence, before directly solving the general
2× 2 cases, we present the following lemmas to simplify the analysis afterward.
Lemma 9. In a general 2 × 2 matching market, any strategy placing non-zero bids on both goods
is a weakly-dominated strategy of a rational buyer with non-zero valuation on goods.
Proof. Please see Appendix D.14.
Lemma 10. If vi1 > vi2, any bidding strategy of buyer i with bi1 < bi2 is a weakly dominated
strategy.
Proof. Please see Appendix D.15.
With the above two lemmas, the following corollary is straightforward.
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Corollary 2. Consider a rational buyer i, any bidding strategy putting non-zero bid on the good
with private value lower than another good is a weakly-dominated strategy.
Now, we can get rid of all weakly-dominated strategies to analyze the buyer’s strategic behavior
to find a symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. It is worth to note that weakly-dominated strate-
gies can still be rationalizable strategies, our approach (analyzing Bayesian Nash equilibrium(BNE)
without taking weakly-dominated strategies into consideration) may miss some BNEs. Our current
goal is not to find all BNEs but just one. Therefore, we can continue to find a BNE with restricted
strategy space.
First, assume vi1 ≥ vi2 without loss of generality, a rational buyer i will bid 0 on the good 2,
and bid no more than v11 − v12 on good 1. Then, we can compute the equilibrium in symmetric
bidding strategies. Assume the symmetric bidding function is β(·, ·) for the good with higher value
and 0 for the other one, buyer i bids b on good 1 and the CDF of buyer −i’s valuation on good j
is F−ij(·), the objective function is
max
b
E(v−i1,v−i2)[ui(b, 0, β1{v−i1>v−i2}, β1{v−i1≤v−i2})], (5)
where β denotes β(v−i1, v−i2).
Now, we need Lemma 11 to simplify our analysis.
Lemma 11. Denote vih to be the buyer i’s value of the good that has higher value and vil be the
buyer i’s value of good that has lower value, an optimal bidding function of the higher good β(vih, vil)
is monotonic in vih − vil.
Proof. Please see Appendix D.16.
With Lemma 11, we can revise and simplify the bidding function β(vih, vil) to be βr(vih − vil).
Define the joint CDF of v−i1−v−i2 to be F−i(·). Then the expected surplus of buyer i for a specific
bid b of good 1 is:
(vi1 − b)F−i(β−1r (b)) + vi2(1− F−i(β−1r (b))) = vi2 + (vi1 − vi2 − bi1)F−i(β−1r (b)) (6)
Therefore, determining the objective function is equivalent to solving the following optimization
problem:
max
b
(vi1 − vi2 − b)F−i(β−1r (b)). (7)
To simplify our problem, let’s assume the distributions of private value on goods of two buyers are
i.i.d. uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Then assume that the bidding function is differentiable and
denote x = vi1 − vi2. Using the same technique we used to solve the symmetric BNE in sponsored
search market. With the analysis in Appendix ??, the bidding function βr(x) is
βr(x) =
1
2− (1− x)2
∫ x
0
2τ(1− τ)dτ = x
2(1− 2x3 )
2− (1− x)2 (8)
Then, the expected revenue is
4
∫ 1
0
βr(x)(1− x)(1
2
+ x− x
2
2
)dx = 2
∫ 1
0
x2(1− 2x3 )(1− x)dx = 2(
1
3
− 5
12
+
2
15
) =
1
10
(9)
Finally, computing the expected revenue with VCG price yields:
4
∫ 1
0
(1− x)
∫ x
0
y(1− y)dydx = 4
∫ 1
0
(1− x)(x
2
2
− x
3
3
)dx = 4(
1
6
− 5
24
+
1
15
) =
1
10
(10)
It is shown here that the revenue equivalence theorem continues to hold in this case.
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D Appendix-Proofs
D.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First, we will show that given a constricted good set S, reducing price of every good in S with the
amount specified in the statement will increase the size of its neighbor, i.e., N(S).
Given a constricted good set S under a specific price vector P. Consider another price vector
P′, P ′j =
{
Pj , j /∈ S
Pj − c, j ∈ S
, where c := mini∈B\N(S),l∈S{maxk∈M\S(vi,k − Pk)− (vi,l − Pl)}.
For some j ∈ S, there must exists an i ∈ B \ N(S) satisfying vi,j − P ′j = maxk∈M\S vi,k − Pk.
Now, by an abuse of notation to denote N ′(S) as the neighbor of S under P ′, i ∈ N ′(S). For those
l ∈ N(S), maxj∈S vl,j − P ′j > maxj∈S vl,j − Pj ≥ maxj∈M\S vl,j − Pj implies l ∈ N ′(S). Therefore,
|N(S)| < |N ′(S)|.
Then, we need to prove that c is the minimum decrement. Consider another price vector
Consider another price vector P′′, P ′j =
{
Pj , j /∈ S
Pj − d, j ∈ S
, where d < c. It is straightforward that
for all i ∈ B \N(S), vi,j −P ′′j < vi,j −Pj + c ≤ maxk(vi,k −Pk). Hence, no buyers will be added to
the N(S). Now, it is clear that mini∈B\N(S),l∈S{maxk∈M\S(vi,k −Pk)− (vi,l−Pl)} is the minimum
price reduction which guarantees to add at least a new buyer to the N(S).
D.2 Proof of Lemma 2
In order to prove the statement, we start from showing the most skewed set is always a constricted
good set when there is no perfect matching. Then, we prove the uniqueness of the most skewed set
by contradiction.
When there is no perfect matching, there must exists a constricted good set. By definition, the
constricted good set S has the property |S| > |N(S)|. Since |S|, |N(S)| are integers, the skewness
of a constricted good set
f(S) = |S| − |N(S)|+ 1|S| ≥ 1 +
1
|S| > 1. (11)
Then, for any non-constricted good set S′, |S′| ≤ |N(S′)|. The skewness of S′ is
f(S′) = |S′| − |N(S′)|+ 1|S′| ≤ 0 +
1
|S′| ≤ 1. (12)
With equation (11), (12), the skewness of a constricted good set is always greater than any non-
constricted good sets. Therefore, if a preference graph exists a constricted good set, the most
skewed set is always a constricted good set.
Then, we start to prove the uniqueness of the most skewed set. Suppose there exists two disjoint
sets S1, S2 and both sets are the most skewed sets, i.e., f(S1) = f(S2) = maxS⊂M,S 6=∅ f(S).
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Consider the skewness of the union of S1 and S2.
f(S1 ∪ S2) (13)
= |S1 ∪ S2| − |N(S1 ∪ S2)|+ 1|S1 ∪ S2| (14)
= |S1|+ |S2| − |N(S1) ∪N(S2)|+ 1|S1 ∪ S2| (15)
≥ |S1|+ |S2| − |N(S1)| − |N(S2)|+ 1|S1 ∪ S2| (16)
= f(S1) + |S2| − |N(S2)| − 1|S1| +
1
|S1 ∪ S2| (17)
≥ f(S1) + 1− 1|S1| +
1
|S1 ∪ S2| > f(S1) (18)
From (17) to (18) is true because S2 is a constricted good set. (18) contradicts our assumption
that S1, S2 are the most skewed set. Therefore, we know that if there exists multiple sets share the
same highest skewness value, these sets are not disjoint.
Now, suppose there exists two sets S1, S2 satisfying that S1∪S2 6= ∅ and both sets are the most
skewed sets, the following two inequalities must hold:
f(S1)− f(S1 ∪ S2) ≥ 0 (19)
f(S2)− f(S1 ∩ S2) ≥ 0 (20)
Let’s sum up the two inequalities and represent the formula in twelve terms.
f(S1) + f(S2)− f(S1 ∪ S2)− f(S1 ∩ S2) (21)
= |S1|+ |S2| − |S1 ∪ S2| − |S1 ∩ S2|
+|N(S1 ∪ S2)|+ |N(S1 ∩ S2)| − |N(S1)| − |N(S2)|
+
1
|S1| +
1
|S2| −
1
|S1 ∪ S2| −
1
|S1 ∩ S2| (22)
The first four terms |S1|+ |S2| − |S1 ∪ S2| − |S1 ∩ S2| = 0. Using the similar argument, |N(S1)|+
|N(S2)| = |N(S1) ∩N(S2)|+ |N(S1) ∪N(S2)|.
|N(S1 ∪ S2)| = |N(S1) ∪N(S2)| (23)
|N(S1 ∩ S2)| ≤ |N(S1) ∩N(S2)| (24)
Equation (24) is true because there may exist some elements in S1\S2 and S2\S1 but have common
neighbors. Thus, the second four terms are smaller than or equal to 0.
To check the last four terms, let |S1| = a, |S2| = b, and |S1 ∩ S2| = c, where c < min{a, b}
because S1, S2 are not disjoint. The last four terms are
1
|S1| +
1
|S2| −
1
|S1 ∪ S2| −
1
|S1 ∩ S2| (25)
=
1
a
+
1
b
− 1
a+ b− c −
1
c
(26)
=
a+ b
ab
− a+ b
(a+ b− c)c (27)
=
a+ b
abc(a+ b− c)(ac+ bc− c
2 − ab) (28)
= −(a+ b)(a− c)(b− c)
abc(a+ b− c) < 0 (29)
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To conclude, the first four terms are 0, the second four terms are smaller than or equal to 0, and
the last four terms are strictly negative make
f(S1) + f(S2)− f(S1 ∪ S2)− f(S1 ∩ S2) < 0. (30)
Therefore, at least one of set S1 ∪ S2, S1 ∩ S2 has the skewness value greater than f(S1) = f(S2),
which leads to a contradiction that S1 and S2 are the most skewed set. Finally, we can claim that
the most skewed set is unique when there is no perfect matching.
D.3 Proof of Lemma 3
First, we prove that the algorithm terminates in finite (at most |M|3) rounds by investigating the
relationship of the most skewed sets in the consecutive rounds, S∗t , S∗t+1.
The relationship of S∗t , S∗t+1 has four cases.
1. S∗t = S∗t+1
2. S∗t ⊂ S∗t+1
3. S∗t ⊃ S∗t+1
4. S∗t * S∗t+1 and S∗t + S∗t+1
Recall that W (G) is the skewness of the graph G and Nt(S) is the neighbor of S based on the
preference graph at round k.
In case 1, W (Gt)−W (Gt+1) = ft(S∗t )− ft+1(S∗t+1) = ft(S∗t )− ft+1(S∗t ) ≥ 1.
In case 2, define S′ = S∗t+1 \ S∗t , and it is trivial that S∗t ⊂ S∗t+1 implies 1 > 1|S∗t | −
1
|S∗t+1| > 0.
W (Gt)−W (Gt+1) = ft(S∗t )− ft+1(S∗t+1) (31)
= |S∗t | − |Nt(S∗t )| − |S∗t+1|+ |Nt+1(S∗t+1)|+
1
|S∗t |
− 1|S∗t+1|
(32)
≥ |S∗t+1| − |Nt(S∗t+1)| − |S∗t+1|+ |Nt+1(S∗t+1)|+
1
|S∗t |
− 1|S∗t+1|
(33)
= |Nt+1(S∗t ∪ S′)| − |Nt(S∗t+1)|+
|S∗t+1| − |S∗t |
|S∗t ||S∗t+1|
≥ |Nt+1(S∗t ∪ S′)| − |Nt(S∗t+1)|+
1
|M|(|M| − 1) (34)
= |Nt+1(S∗t )|+ |Nt+1(S′) ∩Nt+1(S∗t )c| − |Nt(S∗t+1)|+
1
|M|2 − |M| (35)
= |Nt(S∗t )|+ |Nt+1(St) \Nt(S∗t )| − |Nt(S∗t+1)|+ |Nt+1(S′) ∩Nt+1(S∗t )c|+ 1|M|2−|M| (36)
Before going to further steps, we have to briefly explain the logic behind the above equations.
(32) to (33) is true because Nt(S
∗
t ) ⊆ Nt(S∗t+1).
(34) to (35) is to expand |Nt+1(S∗t ∪ S′)| to |Nt+1(S∗t )|+ |Nt+1(S′) ∩Nt+1(S∗t )c|.
(35) to (36) is to expand |Nt+1(S∗t )| to |Nt(S∗t )|+ |Nt+1(St) \Nt(S∗t )|.
Since |Nt+1(S′) ∩ Nt+1(S∗t )c| = |Nt+1(S′) ∩ Nk(S∗t )c| − |Nt+1(S′) ∩ (Nt+1(St) \ Nt(S∗t ))|, and
|Nt+1(St) \ Nt(S∗t )| ≥ |Nt+1(S′) ∩ (Nt+1(St) \ Nt(S∗t ))|, we can further summarize the first four
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terms in (36).
|Nt(S∗t )|+ |Nt+1(St) \Nt(S∗t )|+ |Nt+1(S′) ∩Nt+1(S∗t )c| − |Nt(S∗t+1)| (37)
≥ |Nt(S∗t )|+ |Nt+1(S′) ∩Nk(S∗t )c| − |Nt(S∗t+1)| (38)
= |Nt(S∗t )|+ |Nt+1(S′) ∩Nt(S∗t )c| − |Nt(S∗t )| − |Nt(S′) ∩Nt(S∗t )c| (39)
= |Nt+1(S′) ∩Nt(S∗t )c| − |Nt(S′) ∩Nt(S∗t )c| (40)
= |Nt(S′) ∩Nt(S∗t )c| − |Nt(S′) ∩Nt(S∗t )c| = 0 (41)
(40) to (41) is true because S′ is not in S∗t , the neighbor of S′ not in the neighbor of S∗t remains
the same from k to t+ 1 round.
With equation (36) and (41), we can conclude that W (Gt)−W (Gt+1) ≥ 1|M|2−|M| in case 2.
In case 3, since every elements in S∗t belongs to S∗t , ft(S∗t+1) ≥ ft+1(S∗t+1).
Given that
1
|S∗t |
<
1
|S∗t+1|
and ft(S
∗
t ) − ft(S∗t+1) > 0 by definition, |S∗t | − |S∗t+1| + |Nt(S∗t )| −
|Nt(S∗t+1)| ≥ 1.
With the knowledge that S∗t and S∗t are non-empty set, it is obvious that ft(S∗t ) − ft(S∗t+1) is
lower-bounded by 12 . Therefore, we can conclude that W (G)t −W (Gt+1) = ft(S∗t )− ft+1(S∗t+1) ≥
ft(S
∗
t )− ft(S∗t+1) ≥ 12 in case 3.
In case 4, define S′ = S∗t+1 \ S∗t , S′′ = S∗t \ S∗t+1, and T = S∗t ∩ S∗t+1.
W (Gt)−W (Gt+1) (42)
= ft(S
∗
t )− ft+1(S∗t+1) (43)
= |T |+ |S′′| − |Nt(T )| − |Nt(S′′) \Nt(T )|+ 1|S∗t |
− |T | − |S′|+ |Nt+1(S∗t+1)| −
1
|S∗t+1|
(44)
= |S′′| − |Nt(S′′) \Nt(T )|+ 1|S∗t |
− 1|S∗t+1|
+ |Nt+1(S∗t+1)| − |Nt(T )| − |S′| (45)
≥ 1 + 1|S∗t |
− 1|S∗t+1|
+ |Nt+1(S∗t+1)| − |Nt(T )| − |S′| (46)
≥ 1 + 1|M| − 1 + |Nt+1(T ))| − |Nt(T )|+ |Nt+1(S
′) \Nt+1(T )| − |S′| (47)
=
1
|M| + |Nt+1(T ))| − |Nt(T )|+ |Nt+1(S
′) \Nt+1(T )| − |S′| (48)
≥ 1|M| + |Nt+1(S
′) \Nk(T )| − |S′| ≥ 1|M| (49)
(50)
Most of the equations in case 4 are straight-forward except from (48) to (49).
(48) to (49) is true because of the following inequalities:
|Nt+1(S′) \Nt+1(T )|+ |Nt+1(T ))| − |Nt(T )|
= |Nt+1(S′) \Nt(T )|+ |Nt+1(T ))| − |Nt(T )| − |{Nt+1(S′) ∩Nt+1(T )} \Nt(T )| (51)
≥ |Nt+1(S′) \Nt(T )| − |Nt+1(T ) \Nt(T )|+ |Nt+1(T ))| − |Nt(T )| (52)
= |Nt+1(S′) \Nt(T )| (53)
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Combine these four cases, we know that
W (Gt)−W (Gt+1) ≥ 1|M|2 − |M| . (54)
Therefore, we can conclude that the proposed algorithm terminates in finite rounds. (At most
|M|3 rounds because W (G) < |M| and minimum decrement is greater than 1|M|3 ).
D.4 Proof of Lemma 4
First, we want to show that suppose Mg ∪Mb is a constricted good set, we can not include any
good colored red to increase the skewness of the set. For any set of good colored red Sr being added
to Mg ∪Mb, at least the same size of buyers being matched pairs of those red goods are join to
N(Mg ∪Mb ∪ Sr). Since we know that |N(Sr) \ N(Mg ∪Mb)| ≥ |Sr|, including any set of red
goods will decrease the skewness of the set Mg ∪Mb.
Then, we want to show remove any subset of goods S ⊆Mg ∪Mb will also reduce the skewness
of the set. Clearly, removing any subset of blue good will not reduce N(Mg ∪Mb), hence blue
goods are definitely included in the maximally skewed set. Therefore, we only need to consider
the impact of removing set of green goods S ⊆ Mg. Since for any S ⊆ Mg, there has has
at least one red edge connecting S and N(Mg ∪ Mb \ S) according to the algorithm, Hence,
|N(Mg ∪Mb)| − |N(Mg ∪Mb \ S)| < |S|, which implies that removing any S ⊂ Mg will only
increase the skewness of the set. With these facts and the uniqueness property of the maximally
skewed set, we can conclude that Mg ∪Mb is the maximally skewed set.
D.5 Proof of Lemma 5
We will prove Algorithm 3 always return the most skewed set by contradiction.
Since every untraversed good upon termination can be matched with an untraversed buyer without
repetition. Therefore, adding any set of runtraversed goods SU to the set S will always reduce the
skewness of S (because the increase of cardinality in neighbor of S, |N(SU )| − |N(S)| is always
greater than or equal to the increase of cardinality of S, |SU | − |S|). Hence, the most skewed set
will never contain any untraversed good. Suppose there exists a set S′ is the most skewed set, with
a higher skewness than the set S return by Algorithm 3, S′ must be a subset of S because there’s
no untraversed good in the most skewed set and f(S′) > f(S). Let S∗ = S \ S′, f(S′) > f(S)
and S′ ⊂ S implies |N(S∗) \N(S′)| − |S∗| > 0. If this happens, there must be a non-empty set of
matching pairs match nodes from S∗ to N(S∗) \N(S′) without repetition. Since N(S∗) \N(S′) is
not in N(S′) under the directed graph, nodes in S∗ will not be traversed in the algorithm contradicts
that S∗ ⊂ S.
D.6 Proof of Theorem 1
First, let’s begin with the proof of the first half statement of the theorem, which is a variational
characterization of MCPs.
(⇒) This direction is obvious, otherwise the MCP is not the maximum by definition.
(⇐) Recall thatM is the set of goods. Suppose there exists an MCP P 1 satisfying the conditions
but it is not the maximum MCP. Then there must exist a set of goods S1 such that for all i ∈ S1,
P 1i < P
∗
i , and for all i ∈M− S1, P 1i ≥ P ∗i ; M− S1 can be an empty set.
Let P 2i = P
1
i for all i ∈M− S1, and P 2i = P ∗i for all i ∈ S1.
We will verify that P 2 is an MCP. WLOG, we can assume P 1 and P ∗ have the same allocation;
this is true as every MCP supports all efficient matchings. Then, consider any buyer who is assigned
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a good in S1 under P
∗. When the price vector changes from P ∗ to P 2, the buyer has no profitable
deviation from his/her assigned good because P 2i ≥ P ∗i for all i and P 2j = P ∗j for all j ∈ S1.
Similarly, when the price vector changes from P 1 to P 2, the buyer who is assigned a good inM\S1
under P 1 has no profitable deviation because P 2i = P
1
i for all i ∈ M \ S1 and P 2j > P 1j for all
j ∈ S1. Finally, since P 1 and P ∗ have the same allocation, no buyer will deviate if we assign this
allocation to buyers under P 2. Since all buyers have non-negative surpluses under P 2, it follows
that P 2 is an MCP.
Given P 1, there exists a set of goods S1 whose price we can increase and still get market clearing
because both P 1 and P 2 are MCPs. This contradicts the assumption that P 1 satisfies the stated
conditions, and the proof of the variational characterization follows.
For the second half part, which is a combinatorial characterization of MCPs, let’s try to prove
the statement using the result of the variational characterization. Given that we cannot increase
the price for any subset of goods, it implies that for any subset of goods S, the set of corresponding
matched buyer, either there exists at least one buyer has an edge connected to a good not in this
subset or there exists at least one buyer with surplus zero. In the former case, it is obvious that
B < N(B) for such corresponding buyer set B. In the later case, B ≤ N(B) and D ∈ ND(B)
guarantees B < ND(B).
For the opposite direction, if every set of buyer with B < ND(B) under the current MCP,
increasing the price for any set of good will make at least one corresponding buyer deviate from
the matched good and cause no perfect matching. Therefore, the condition in variational charac-
terization holds if and only if the condition in the combinatorial characterization holds.
D.7 Proof of Theorem 2
As mentioned earlier, showing the algorithm returns the maximum MCP is equivalent to show that
when the algorithm terminates, the bipartite structure guarantees that we can not increase the
price of any subset of good with the result in Theorem 1. It implies that after adding a dummy
good with zero price, the support of any subset of goods has a size less than the size of the subset
of goods, i.e., |B| < |NDT (B)|. Therefore, the proof of the theorem can be transformed to prove
that the algorithm satisfies |B| < |NDT (B)| for any non-empty set of buyer B on termination. Let’s
start the proof with several claims.
Claim 1. For any subset of buyer B, B 6= ∅, |B| ≤ |NDT (B)|, where T is the terminating time of
our algorithm.
Since our algorithm returns an MCP vector, if |B| > |NDT (B)|, there does not exist a perfect
matching because of the existence of constricted buyer set.
Claim 2. There does not exists a subset of buyer B ⊆ B, B 6= ∅, |B| = |NDT (B)| and D ∈ NDT (B),
where T is the terminating time of our algorithm.
|B| = |NDT (B)| and D ∈ NDT (B), imply |B| > |NT (B)|. The preference graph has constricted
sets and has no perfect matching.
Claim 3. There does not exists a subset of buyer B ⊆ B, B 6= ∅, |B| = |NT (B)|, where T is the
terminating time of our algorithm.
Proof. With Claim 1, 2, it is equivalent to show |B| < |NT (B)|.
At time t, we denote the maximum non-negative surplus of buyer b by u∗t (b) and the most skewed
set by S∗t ; andBst is the set of buyers with positive surplus at time t, i.e.,Bst = {b|u∗t (b) > 0, b ∈ B}.
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It is obvious that Bsi ⊆ Bsj for all i < j. Then, we want to prove the claim by mathematical
induction.
Prior to the proof, we need to introduce another claim.
Claim 4. ∀B ⊆ Nt(S∗t ), 0 ≤ t < T , |B| < |Nt(B) ∩ S∗t )| = |Nt+1(B)|
Proof. If the left inequality does not hold, we can remove all the goods contained in Nt(B) ∩ S∗t
from S∗t to get a more skewed set, which violates that S∗t is the most skewed one.
Since we reduce the price in S∗t , buyers in B will not prefer any good outside of S∗t . Therefore,
Nt(B) ∩ S∗t and Nt+1(B) are identical. Hence |Nt(B) ∩ S∗t | = |Nt+1(B)| is absolutely true.
Now, we can prove Claim 3 by induction.
At t=0, Bs0 = ∅.
At t=1, Bs1 = N′(S∗0). With Claim 4, |B| < |N1(B)| ∀B ⊆ Bs1 and B 6= ∅.
At a finite time t, suppose for all B ⊆ Bst , B 6= ∅ satisfy |B| < |Nt(B)|, consider at time t+ 1:
Since Bst ⊆ Bst+1, Bst+1 contains three disjoint components:
Bst+1 = {Bst ∩Nt(S∗t )c} ∪ {Bst ∩Nt(S∗t )} ∪ {Bst c ∩Nt(S∗t )} (55)
Buyers in the first two parts are originally with positive utilities. Buyers in the last part have
zero utilities at time t but have positive utilities at time t+ 1.
Consider the subset of buyers Bα ⊆ {Bst ∩ Nt(S∗t )c}. Since every b ∈ Bα does not prefer any
good in S∗t , the price reduction in S∗t will never remove any edges between {Bst ∩ Nt(S∗t )c} and
Nt({Bst ∩Nt(S∗t )c}). Therefore, for any non-empty set of buyers Bα, |Bα| < |Nt(Bα)| ≤ |Nt+1(Bα)|.
Then, consider the second and the third parts. Since {Bst ∩Nt(S∗t )}∪{Bst c∩Nt(S∗t )} = Nt(S∗t ),
every non-empty set of buyers Bβ ⊆ Nt(S∗t ) satisfies |Bβ| < |Nt+1(Bβ)| by Claim 4.
At the last step, consider Bγ = Bγ1 ∪ Bγ2 , where Bγ1 ⊆ {Bst ∩ Nt(S∗t )c}, Bγ2 ⊆ Nt(S∗t ) and
Bγ1 , Bγ2 6= ∅.
|Nt+1(Bγ)| = |Nt+1(Bγ1) ∪Nt+1(Bγ2)| (56)
= |Nt+1(Bγ1)|+ |Nt+1(Bγ2)| − |Nt+1(Bγ1) ∩Nt+1(Bγ2)| (57)
= |Nt+1(Bγ1)| − |Nt+1(Bγ1) ∩Nt+1(Bγ2)|+ |Nt+1(Bγ2)| (58)
= |Nt+1(Bγ1) ∩Nt+1(Bγ2)c|+ |Nt+1(Bγ2)| (59)
≥ |Nt+1(Bγ1) ∩Nt+1(Nt(S∗t ))c|+ |Nt+1(Bγ2)| (60)
= |Nt+1(Bγ1) ∩ S∗t c|+ |Nt+1(Bγ2)| (61)
= |Nt(Bγ1)|+ |Nt+1(Bγ2)| (62)
> |Bγ1)|+ |Bγ2 | = |Bγ | (63)
From (60) to (61) is true because after price reduction at time t, buyer belongs to the neighbor
of constricted good set S∗t will only prefer goods in S∗t , therefore Nt+1(Nt(S∗t )) = S∗t .
From (61) to (62) is true because Nt(Bγ1) ∩ S∗t = ∅ (by definition). Then, we have discussed
before that the price reduction in S∗t will never remove any edges between {Bst ∩ Nt(S∗t )c} and
Nt({Bst ∩Nt(S∗t )c}). Since goods not in the most skewed set at time t will not add new buyers to
their neighbor, the equivalence between Nt+1(Bγ1) ∩ S∗t c and Nt(Bγ1) holds.
Therefore, for every non empty set of buyers B ⊆ Bst+1, |B| < |Nt+1(B)|.
The mathematical induction works for all k ∈ N. Since our algorithm terminates in finite round,
|B| < |NT (B)|, Q.E.D.
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With Claim 1, 2, 3, the skew-aided algorithm satisfies |B| < |NDt (B)| for any non-empty set of
buyer B on termination.
D.8 Proof of Theorem 3
First, we know from Section 5.2 that the preference graph changes at most m2 times in Algorithm
1.
Second, we analyze the initial step first. In Algorithm 3, the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm runs in
time O(|M|2.5), and the complexity of the BFS algorithm is O(m+ |number of edges|). Since the
number of directed edges is upper-bounded by m2, the complexity of Algorithm 3 is O(m2.5+m2) =
O(m2.5). Then, for each a ∈ A colored blue, we run at most twice of BFS/DFS algorithm, which
has complexity upper-bounded by O(m + |number of edges|) ≥ O(m2). After that, we do things
similar to find the maximum matching if we can add at least one blue buyer to the maximum
matching, and run at most twice BFS/DFS. Therefore, the complexity should be upper-bounded
by O(m2.5 + 2×m2) = O(m2.5). If we know that there is no blue buyers going to be added in this
round, we do not need to find a new maximum matching. Therefore, the total complexity of the
algorithm attaining the maximum MCP will be upper-bounded by the {(complexity of updating
process not recoloring blue buyers)+(complexity of computing price reduction)}× (convergence rate
of the preference graph)+(complexity of updating process increasing maximum matched pairs)×
(maximum number of blue buyers)= O((m2 +m2)×m2 +m2.5 ×m) = O(m4)
D.9 Proof of Lemma 7
Suppose the picked set which is not the most skewed one, this set must contain a pair of good-
buyer (x, y) not in the maximally skewed set. Since we know that algorithm terminates at round
T , reducing the price of the good x make the price vector lower than the maximum MCP at round
T . (Because if we pick another set excluding good x, reducing the same amount of price as we did
in this algorithm will also terminate at T .) Therefore, we know that the constricted good set we
pick should not include any good not in the maximally skewed set. Now, we want to claim that the
picked set is a subset of the maximally skewed set will never happen. If such a set S exists and can
terminate the algorithm at round T , then the most skewed set S∗ contains a set of goods S∗ \ S is
already perfectly matched to a set of buyers outside N(S), and the skewness of S must be greater
than S∗, which contradicts that S∗ is the most skewed set. Because of the above claims, we can
conclude that any choice of constricted good set which is not the maximally skewed set at round
T will never return the maximum MCP at round T .
D.10 Proof of Theorem 4
First, it is obvious that the current market adding a duplicate pair of buyer buyer i and its matched
good j is still market clearing and the social welfare will be the (the current social welfare)+U∗i +Pj .
Hence, what we need to show is the current market adding a duplicate buyer buyer i has the social
welfare: (the current social welfare) + U∗i . Since adding a dummy good will not change the social
welfare, we can transfer our problem to prove that the current market adding a duplicate buyer
buyer i and a dummy good has the social welfare (the current social welfare) + U∗i + 0. It is
equivalent to show that the current market adding a duplicate buyer buyer i and a dummy good
is still market clearing. Using the combinatorial characterization of the maximum MCP, we know
that |B| < |ND(B)| for any subset of B in the current market. Denote the buyer set of current
market as B and the duplicate buyer i as iˆ , what we want to show is that |B| ≤ |ND(B)| for any
B ∈ {B ∪ iˆ}.
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If at least one of i, iˆ not in B, it is straightforward that |B| < |ND(B)|.
If both i, iˆ ∈ B, |B| = |B \ iˆ|+ 1 ≤ |ND(B \ iˆ)− 1|+ 1 = |ND(B \ iˆ)| ≤ |ND(B)|).
Using the Hall’s marriage theorem, the inequality guaranteed that the current market adding
a duplicate buyer buyer i and a dummy good is market clearing, and the proof stands here.
D.11 Verification of Asymmetric BNE in a 3× 3 matching market
Given the valuation matrix described in Table 1, we want to verify that if the strategy profile
{βAlice(w, 0, 0), βBob(x, 0, 0.5), βCarol(y, z, 2)} = {(max{1−, w2 }, 0, 0), (max{1, 2x−14 }, 0, 0), (0, , 0)},
where  is an infinitesimal is a BNE.
First, consider Alice’s best response according to Bob’s strategy (max{1, 2x−14 }, 0, 0) and Carol’s
strategy (0, , 0). When Alice has valuation between [0, 1] on the listing ads, any bidding strategy
(b, 0, 0) is a best response for all b < 1 because Alice will always get the Pop-ups at price zero.
Then, when Alice has valuation w between (2, 3] on the listing ads. The bidding function maximizes
Alice’s expected payoff is
max
b
∫ 3.5
1.5
(w − b)1{b>max{1,(2x−1)/4}}fx(x)dx (64)
= max
b
{2
3
(w − b) + 1
3
∫ 3.5
2.5
(w − b)1{b>max{1,(2x−1)/4}}dx
}
(65)
= max
b
2
3
(w − b) + 1
3
(w − b)× 2(b− 1) (66)
Now, it is easy to solve the optimal bid of Alice is
arg max
b
2
3
(w − b) + 1
3
(w − b)× 2(b− 1) (67)
= arg max
b
(w − b) + (w − b)(b− 1) = w
2
(68)
Since w2 < 1 for all w ∈ [0, 1) and w2 > 1 for all w ∈ (2, 3] , we can conclude that (max{1−, w2 }, 0, 0)
is a best response of Alice under {βBob(x, 0, 0.5), βCarol(y, z, 2)} = {(max{1, 2x−14 }, 0, 0), (0, , 0)}.
Second, we use the similar technique to get Bob’s best response. Given the strategy of Alice
and Carol as mentioned, Bob can always get the Pop-ups with price 0. Therefore, the bidding
function maximizes Bob’s expected payoff is
max
b
0.5 +
∫ 3
0
(w − b− 0.5)1{b>max{1,w
2
}}fw(w)dw (69)
= 0.5 + max
b
{2
3
(w − b− 0.5)1{b≥1} +
1
3
∫ 3
2
(w − b− 0.5)1{b>max{1,w
2
}}dw
}
(70)
= 0.5 + max
b
2
3
(w − b− 0.5)1{b≥1} +
2
3
(w − b− 0.5)(b− 1) (71)
The optimal bid of Bob is
arg max
b
2
3
(w − b− 0.5)1{b≥1} +
2
3
(w − b− 0.5)(b− 1) (72)
= arg max
b
(w − b− 0.5)(b− 1 + 1{b≥1}) = max{1,
2x− 1
4
} (73)
Last, we have to verify the Carol’s best response given {βAlice(w, 0, 0), βBob(x, 0, 0.5)} = {(max{1−
, w2 }, 0, 0), (max{1, 2x−14 }, 0, 0)}. To against any tie-breaking rule not in favor of Carol, the strategy
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(0, , 0) is the minimum bid to ensure getting the sidebar ads. Now, we complete the verification that
{βAlice(w, 0, 0), βBob(x, 0, 0.5), βCarol(y, z, 2)} = {(max{1−, w2 }, 0, 0), (max{1, 2x−14 }, 0, 0), (0, , 0)}
is an (asymmetric) BNE in this 3× 3 matching market.
D.12 Proof of Lemma 8
We prove the monotonicity by contradiction.
Suppose there exists two weight x > y such that β(x) < β(y), where β(·) is the optimal bidding
function. It guarantees that the expected surplus of bidding β(x) is never worse than bidding β(y)
given the private weight x. (Otherwise it is not the optimal bidding function.) Similarly, it also has
to satisfy that the expected surplus of bidding β(y) will be never worse than bidding β(x) given
the private weight y. Mathematically, the following two inequality should hold.∫ 1
0
(c1x− [(c1 − c2)β(x) + c2β(u)])fw(u)1{β(x)>β(u)}du+
∫ 1
0
c2(x− β(x))fw(u)1{β(x)≤β(u)}du
≥
∫ 1
0
(c1x− [(c1 − c2)β(y) + c2β(u)])fw(u)1{β(y)>β(u)}du+
∫ 1
0
c2(x− β(y))fw(u)1{β(y)≤β(u)}du(74)
∫ 1
0
(c1y − [(c1 − c2)β(y) + c2β(u)])fw(u)1{β(y)>β(u)}du+
∫ 1
0
c2(y − β(y))fw(u)1{β(y)≤β(u)}du
≥
∫ 1
0
(c1y − [(c1 − c2)β(x) + c2β(u)])fw(u)1{β(x)>β(u)}du+
∫ 1
0
c2(y − β(x))fw(u)1{β(x)≤β(u)}du(75)
Now, let us sum up and summarize the inequalities (74), (75).∫ 1
0
c1(x− y)fw(u)1{β(x)>β(u)}du+
∫ 1
0
c2(x− y)fw(u)1{β(x)≤β(u)}du
≥
∫ 1
0
c1(x− y)fw(u)1{β(y)>β(u)}du+
∫ 1
0
c2(x− y)fw(u)1{β(y)≤β(u)}du (76)
Then, the inequality can be further simplified to the following:
(x− y)
∫ 1
0
(c1 − c2)fw(u)(1{β(x)>β(u)} − 1{β(y)>β(u)})du ≥ 0 (77)
Since x > y and β(x) < β(y), (x − y) ∫ 10 (c1 − c2)fw(u)(1{β(x)>β(u)} − 1{β(y)>β(u)})du < 0 holds
given that the private weight w is uniformly distributed from [0,1], which contradicts inequality 77
and the proof stands here.
D.13 Proof of Corollary 1
Using the same technique as we used in the proof of Lemma 8, we can use induction to generalized
to a finite-slots sponsored search markets.
Consider the advertisers’ private weight are symmetrical distributed from a distribution D.
Suppose there exists two weight x > y such that β(x) < β(y), where β(·) is the optimal bidding
function. Suppose there are n slots and let ui be other advertiser i’s private weight, assuming
β(ui) ≥ β(uj) ∀i > j without loss of generality. Define the space A = {(u1, u2, ..., un−1)|β(ui) ≥
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β(uj) ∀i < j}, β(u0) = +∞, and cn+1 = 0, the two inequalities that the optimal bidding function
have to satisfy are as follows:
n−1∑
i=1
(
n−1
k
) ∮
A
{
cix− β(x)(ci − ci+1)−
n∑
j=i+1
β(uj−1)(cj − cj+1)
}
1{β(ui−1)≥β(x)>β(ui)}
n−1∏
k=i
fD(uk)duk
≥
n−1∑
i=1
(
n−1
k
) ∮
A
{
cix− β(y)(ci − ci+1)−
n∑
j=i+1
β(uj−1)(cj − cj+1)
}
1{β(ui−1)≥β(y)>β(ui)}
n−1∏
k=i
fD(uk)duk
n−1∑
i=1
(
n−1
k
) ∮
A
{
ciy − β(y)(ci − ci+1)−
n∑
j=i+1
β(uj−1)(cj − cj+1)
}
1{β(ui−1)≥β(y)>β(ui)}
n−1∏
k=i
fD(uk)duk
≥
n−1∑
i=1
(
n−1
k
) ∮
A
{
ciy − β(x)(ci − ci+1)−
n∑
j=i+1
β(uj−1)(cj − cj+1)
}
1{β(ui−1)≥β(x)>β(ui)}
n−1∏
k=i
fD(uk)duk
Now, we have to sum up the two inequalities above and cancel terms exist in both sides.
n−1∑
i=1
(
n−1
k
) ∮
A
ci(x− y)1{β(ui−1)≥β(x)>β(ui)}
n−1∏
k=i
fD(uk)duk
≥
n−1∑
i=1
(
n−1
k
) ∮
A
ci(y − x)1{β(ui−1)≥β(y)>β(ui)}
n−1∏
k=i
fD(uk)duk (78)
We can further simplify the inequality (78) to be the following inequality:
(x− y)
n−1∑
i=1
(
n−1
k
) ∮
A
ci{1{β(ui−1)≥β(x)>β(ui)} − 1{β(ui−1)≥β(y)>β(ui)}}
n−1∏
k=i
fD(uk)duk ≥ 0 (79)
Given that ci ≥ cj for all i < j, x > y and β(x) < β(y), the above inequality is always ≤ 0 and
the equality holds when FD(x) − FD(y) = 0. Therefore, we can claim that the optimal bidding
function in sponsored search markets with symmetric advertisers are monotonic increasing with the
advertiser’s private weight.
D.14 Proof of Lemma 9
Consider buyer i’s bid bi1, bi2 on good 1 and 2. WLOG, suppose b11, b12 6= 0. If b11 + b22 ≥
b12 + b21 (the scenario that player 1 will win good 1). The price of good 1 is P1 = b11 − (b12 −
b22)1{b11≥b21,b12≥b22}. Similarly, if b11 + b22 < b12 + b21 (the scenario that player 1 will win good 2).
The price of good 2 at this time is P1 = b12 − (b11 − b21)1{b11≥b21,b12≥b22}.
The buyer 1’s surplus is
u1(b11, b12, b21, b22)
= (v11 − b11)1{b11+b22≥b12+b21} + (v12 − b12)(1− 1{b11+b22≥b12+b21})
+1{b11≥b21,b12≥b22}
[
(b12 − b22)1{b11+b22≥b12+b21} + (b11 − b21)(1− 1{b11+b22≥b12+b21})
]
Now, define c = min{b11, b12} and consider another bidding strategy (b∗11, b∗12) that (b∗11 = b11 − c,
(b∗12 = b12 − c. Since reducing same amount of bids on both goods reduces the same amount on
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b11 + b22 and b12 + b21, this new bidding strategy will not change the probability of buyer 1 to
win good 1 or 2. Therefore, we can calculate the difference of surplus between these two bidding
strategy:
u1(b
∗
11, b
∗
12, b21, b22)− u1(b11, b12, b21, b22) (80)
= (b11 − b∗11)1{b11+b22≥b12+b21} + (b12 − b∗12)(1− 1{b11+b22≥b12+b21})
−1{b11≥b21,b12≥b22}
[
(b12 − b22)1{b11+b22≥b12+b21} + (b11 − b21)(1− 1{b11+b22≥b12+b21})
]
= c[1{b11+b22≥b12+b21} + (1− 1{b11+b22≥b12+b21})]
−1{b11≥b21,b12≥b22}
[
(b12 − b22)1{b11+b22≥b12+b21} + (b11 − b21)(1− 1{b11+b22≥b12+b21})
]
(81)
≥ c− 1{b11≥b21,b12≥b22}
[
c1{b11+b22≥b12+b21} + c(1− 1{b11+b22≥b12+b21})
]
(82)
= c− c1{b11≥b21,b12≥b22} ≥ 0 (83)
The most critical part is from (81) to (82). When b11 + b22 ≥ b12 + b21, b11 ≥ b21, and b12 ≥ b22,
they imply that b12 ≥ b22 ≤ min{b11, b12} = c. Similarly, b11 + b22 ≤ b12 + b21, b11 ≥ b21, and
b12 ≥ b22 imply b11 ≥ b21 ≤ min{b11, b12} = c. With Equation (83), we can conclude that any
strategy placing non-zero bids on both goods is a weakly-dominated strategy.
D.15 Proof of Lemma 10
If a strategy bid bi1, bi2 satisfying bi1 < bi2 when vi1 > vi2, consider another strategy bid b
∗
i1, b
∗
i2 as
follows:
b∗i1 = bi1
b∗i2 =
{
bi1 if vi1 > vi2
bi2 otherwise
(84)
With Lemma 9, we can assume bi1 = 0. Used the similar technique to compare the buyer’s surplus
when vi1 > vi2.
ui(b
∗
i1, b
∗
i2, b−i1, b−i2)− ui(bi1, bi2, b−i1, b−i2) = ui(0, 0, b−i1, b−i2)− ui(0, bi2, b−i1, b−i2)
= vi11{b−i2≥b−i1} + vi2(1− 1{b−i2≥b−i1})− vi11{b−i2≥bi2+b−i1} − (vi2 − bi2)(1− 1{b−i2≥bi2+b−i1})
= bi2(1− 1{b−i2≥bi2+b−i1}) + (vi1 − vi2)1{b−i1+bi2≥b−i2≥b−i1} ≥ 0 (85)
Since equation (85) is non-negative. The lemma is proved.
D.16 Proof of Lemma 11
Suppose β(vih, vil) = b
∗ > b′ = β(v′ih, v
′
il) but vih−vil < v′ih−v′il, consider another bidding function
β′ exchanges the bid between these two pair of valuations and bids the same as β otherwise. Suppose
the original bidding function is optimal, the following two inequality holds:
[(vih − β(vih, vil))Pr(win higher valued good with bid β(vih, vil))
+ vilPr(win lower valued good with bid β(vih, vil))]
− (vih − β′(vih, vil))Pr(win higher valued good with bid β′(vih, vil))
− vilPr(win lower valued good with bid β′(vih, vil)) ≥ 0 (86)
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[(v′ih − β(v′ih, v′il))Pr(win higher valued good with bid β(v′ih, v′il))
+ v′ilPr(win lower valued good with bid β(v
′
ih, v
′
il))]
− (v′ih − β′(v′ih, v′il))Pr(win higher valued good with bid β′(v′ih, v′il))
− v′ilPr(win lower valued good with bid β′(v′ih, v′il)) ≥ 0 (87)
Sum up the above two inequality and we know that
Pr(win higher valued good with bid β′(v′ih, v
′
il)) = Pr(win higher valued good with bid β(vih, vil))
We will get
[(vih − vil)− (v′ih − v′il)][Pr(win higher valued good with bid b∗)
− Pr(win higher valued good with bid b’)] ≥ 0 (88)
However, we know vih − vil) < (v′ih − v′il) and b∗ > b′. there’s a contradiction. Hence, the optimal
bidding function of the higher good β(vih, vil) is monotonic to vih − vil.
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